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An Honest Approach 
to Plea Bargaining 
Steven P. Grossman t 
Abstract 
In this Article, the author argues that differential sentencing of criminal 
defendants who plead guilty and those who go to trial is, primarily, a 
punishmentfor the defendant exercising the right to trial. The proposed 
solution requires an analysis of the differential sentencing motivation 
in light of the benefit to society and the drawbacks inherent in the plea 
bargaining system. 
I. Introduction 
The process by which criminal convictions come about through guilty 
pleas in exchange for sentencing considerations carries with it the almost 
inevitable result that those who refuse a plea bargain are punished for 
exercising the right to trial. I This punishment for exercising the right to 
trial, and the deterrent impact that such a punishment creates for criminal 
defendants considering whether to go to trial, take place not in rare 
instances but in the overwhelming number of cases disposed of in federal 
and state criminal court systems.2 That this punishment for exercising 
the right to trial exists and takes place in most cases is hardly a surprise 
to judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, or criminal defendants with any 
experience in the criminal justice system. In fact, the system feeds upon 
the existence of punishment for exercising the right to trial as well as on 
t B.A., City College ofNew York (1969); J.D. Brooklyn Law School (1973); LL.M. 
New York University School of Law (1977). Professor Grossman is the Dean Julius 
Isaacson Professor at the University ofBaltirnore School of Law and is a former New 
York City prosecutor. The author would like to thank Sarah Duran, Alyssa LaBarre, 
and Tara Pehush for their assistance in researching this Article. 
I See infra Section III. 
2 An estimated ninety percent of cases result in a guilty plea. THE PRESIDENT'S 
COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THEADMINISTRA TION OF JUSTICE, TASKFoRCE 
REpORT: THE COURTS 9 (1967) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S COMM'N]; GEORGE F. COLE, 
THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF CRIMINALJUSTICE 417 (6th ed. 1986); see also United States 
v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 772 (2005) (stating that "over 95% of all federal criminal 
prosecutions are terminated by a plea bargain"). 
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the requirement that all the players in the system are aware that this 
occurs.3 
Those who deny that exchanging pleas of guilt for sentence reductions 
is punishment for exercising the right to trial rely on a number of explana-
tions and justifications. The one most frequently heard, especially from 
judges who understandably wish to deny they would punish anyone for 
exercising such a fundamental constitutional right, is largely semantic in 
nature. No one gets "punished" for going to trial it is said, but those who 
plead guilty get a "benefit" for doing SO.4 People who opt to exercise their 
right to trial are not receiving a longer sentence because oftheir choice. 
Instead, those who plead guilty are being rewarded with reduced sentences 
for surrendering their right to trial. Supporters ofthis distinction would 
have you believe the result is a satisfying win-win proposition.s 
An analysis of this win-win claim and the necessarily accompanying 
attempt to create a punishment-benefit dichotomy, however, show that 
these assertions fail both theoretically and pragmatically. The assertions 
fail whether we compare the sentence the criminal defendant would get 
ifhe decides to plead guilty to what that same defendant actually gets after 
being convicted at trial, or whether we compare the defendant who goes 
to trial to other similarly situated defendants who plead guilty.6 Judicial 
efforts to maintain this false dichotomy result in opinions that are 
disingenuous and inconsistent. 7 
Once it is acknowledged that there is a difference in the degree of 
punishment meted out between a defendant who goes to trial and a simi-
larly situated one who pleads guilty (a virtually undisputed assertion8), 
the reason for this difference should have to conform to one or more of 
the accepted goals of punishment: retribution, deterrence, incapacitation 
or rehabilitation.9 If it does not, it is hard to understand how differential 
sentencing can be anything but punishment for exercising the right to trial 
3 See infra Section VI. 
4 See infra subsection III(A). 
5 See infra subsection III(A). 
6 See infra subsections III(A)( 1) and (2). 
7 See infra subsection III(A)(2). 
8 See infra Section III. 
9 See infra Section IV. 
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(unless one accepts the punishment-benefit dichotomy discussed in detail 
below). In fact, only one ofthese punishment goals could account for this 
difference in sentencing between defendants who plead guilty and those 
who go to trial. This goal, rehabilitation, may work in theory as an ex-
planation for differential sentencing, but in reality, it explains sentencing 
differences in only a very few instances. 10 
This Article argues that differential sentencing between defendants 
who plead guilty and those who go to trial is, in large part, punishment 
for exercising the right to trial. This punishment pervades the criminal 
justice system and is necessary for the system's continuation in present 
form. II The significance of recognizing this is not to end the debate over 
the wisdom of plea bargaining but to begin it, at least to begin it through 
an honest dialogue. That plea bargaining punishes defendants for going 
to trial does not necessarily mean either that it is unconstitutional or that 
we should do away with it. It means only that there needs to be a compel-
ling reason or reasons to use a system that punishes for the exercise of 
a constitutional right,12 and that there must be safeguards for minimizing 
this punishment and for providing sufficient guarantees of fairness within 
the system. There are strong arguments both for and against plea bar-
gaining, \3 but one must get beyond the semantic and unrealistic defenses 
of plea bargaining in order to get to the arguments. 
II. History 
The history of plea bargaining in this country is filled with intellectual 
dishonesty stemming often from the belief that there was something dirty 
about allowing those accused of crimes to "cop a plea.,,14 Common were 
10 See infra Section IV. 
11 See infra Section III. 
12 See infra Section VII. 
13 See infra Section VII. 
14 Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 13 LAW &Soc'yREv. 211, 
232 (1979); John H. Langbein, Understanding the Short History of Plea Bargaining, 
13 LAW & SOC'y REv. 262, 267-68 (1979); Lynn M. Mather, Comments on the History 
of Plea Bargaining, 13 LAW & Soc'yREv. 281, 281 (1979). In the Seventeenth and 
Eighteenth Centuries, most criminals who committed felonies punishable by death used 
pleas to avoid the death penalty. See COLE, supra note 2 (discussing the "copping out 
ceremony"). 
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the images of back door deals between lawyers and judges in which 
defendants often charged with horrible crimes pled guilty to far less 
serious crimes. IS The public perception of plea bargaining was not 
surprising, given the motivations ofthose within the system to encourage 
cases to be disposed of without trials and the manner in which plea 
bargains were often made and entered. 16 
The criminal justice system feeds offplea bargains and the avoidance 
of trials; prosecutors, judges, and defense attorneys often find it within 
their best interest to dispose of cases without a trial. 17 Until the last few 
decades, it was common for defendants to deny that any promises were 
made as part of the plea bargain, when in fact, clear promises were 
made. 18 Judges feared that plea bargaining had not been officially sanc-
IS Mather, supra note 14, at 281-82. In one case, ajudge described a plea agreement 
as "essentially immoral" and against public policy. Wight v. Rindskopf, 43 Wis. 344, 
361-63 (1877). In another case from 1939, a defendant was surprisingly candid about 
his goal of getting a better deal: 
Petitioner and co-defendant made a voluntary statement ... three days before 
sentence, which shows clearly that petitioner knew the nature ofthe charges against 
him and intended to plead guilty. He and his co-defendant attempted to bargain with 
the United States Attorney about the sentences they would receive in the event of 
a plea of guilty. The co-defendant stated in petitioner's presence: "Well, we would 
like to clear this whole business up and 'cop' a plea to it and take our time, and we 
don't care to • cop' a plea and get sentenced on every one. We want to try to fix it 
up some way to 'cop' a plea on one indictment and throw the rest aside .... I am 
not afraid of that bank job but I am afraid of that kidnapping. They can sock you 
with life .. " We realize we are going to be convicted of it anyway. 
Logan v. Johnston, 28 F. Supp. 98, 99 (N.D. Cal. 1939). 
16 Stephanos Bibas, 2004 Survey of Books Relating to the Law: Pleas' Progress, 
102 MICH. L. REv. 1024, 1040 (2004); Michael J. Lightfoot, Symposium: Responsibili-
ties of the Criminal Defense Attorney: On a Level Playing Field, 30 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 
69,72(1996). 
17 For prosecutors, the goal is to dispose of cases and reduce the backlog while main-
taining their conviction rate. Likewise, defense attorneys suffer from a shortage of staff 
and heavy case loads-a pressure that is even greater on a private attorney who earns more 
money by ending cases in pleas rather than going to trial. Finally, the judge is under 
the same pressure to keep cases moving and to reduce backlogs so that justice is not 
delayed. MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENCES OF PROSECUTORS, 
JUDGES, AND DEFENSE ArrORNEYS 25-26 (1978). 
18 See Kenneth Kipnis, Criminal Justice and the Negotiated Plea, in CONTROVERSIES 
IN CRIMINAL LAW 250 (Michael GOIT & Sterling Harward eds., 1992) ("Not too long 
ago plea bargaining was an officially prohibited practice. Court procedures were fol-
lowed to ensure that no concessions had been given to defendants in exchange for guilty 
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tioned by the Supreme Court,19 and there was something that sounded 
nefarious about defendants acknowledging during the plea allocution that 
promises were made to induce guilty pleas. Defendants were lying when 
they denied that any such promises were made to them, and the defense 
attorney, prosecutor, and judge all knew this was a lie because they had 
just negotiated the promises. 20 Occasionally, a defendant would lapse and 
tell the truth, forgetting he was not supposed to reveal that his guilty plea 
was made in exchange for the promise to cut his potential sentence in half. 
In a number of cases, the Supreme Court has sanctioned the practice 
of differential sentencing and plea bargaining.21 Because ofthis and the 
discomfort that grew among lawyers and judges from the dishonesty of 
denying that promises were made, the common practice now (often 
statutorily required) is that all promises made during the plea negotiations 
be put on the record when the defendant's plea is made and accepted by 
the court.22 
pleas. But gradually it became widely known that these procedures had become charades 
of perjury, shysterism, and bad faith involving judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys 
and defendants. "); Lawrence M. Friedman, Plea Bargaining in Historical Perspective, 
13 LAW &SOC'YREv. 248,253-56 (1979) (Traditionally, plea bargaining was "implicit" 
because there may be no actual bargaining but defendants realized that a guilty plea 
would benefit them. Starting in the 1950s, "plea bargaining took center stage. Defen-
dants, with lawyers at their sides, relied less on 'understandings,' more on outrightnego-
tiation. "). 
19 LEWIS KATZ, JUSTICE IS THE CRIME: PRETRIAL DELAY IN FELONY CASES 210 
(1972); see also Shelton v. United States, 246 F.2d 571 (5th Cir. 1957) (discussing 
whether a plea bargain is a free and voluntary plea), rev'd, 356 U.S. 26 (1958). 
20 WILLIAM F. McDONALD, PLEA BARGAINING: CRITICAL ISSUES AND COMMON 
PRACTICES 110 (1985) (referring to the '''pious fraud' of denying for the record that any 
promises, threats or inducements had influenced the plea"). 
21 See, e.g., United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, on remand at 54 F.3d 613 
(9th Cir. 1995); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, reh 'g denied, 435 U.S. 918 
(1978); Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212 (1978); Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 
257 (1971), remanded to 39 A.D.2d654 (N.Y. App. Div. 1972); Bradyv. United States, 
397 U.S. 742, laterproceedingat433 F.2d 742 (10thCir. 1970); McMann v. Richard-
son, 397 U.S. 759, on remand at 453 F.2d 745 (2d Cir. 1970), appeal after remand at 
340 F. Supp. 136 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), afJ'd without opinion by 458 F.2d 1406 (2d Cir. 
1972); see also Malvina Halberstam, Criminal Law: Towards Neutral Principles in the 
Administration o/CriminaiJustice: A Critique o/Supreme Court Decisions Sanctioning 
the Plea Bargaining Process, 73 1. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1982). 
22 See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(2); ARIZ. ST. R.C.R.P. R. 17.4(c), (t); FLA. R. 
CRIM. P. 3.172(c)(7); MD. Rule 4-246(b); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-7-2 (Michie 
2004). 
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Still, among the public, there is a perception that there is something 
unseemly about plea bargaining.23 The feeling still exists that backroom 
promises are made for the benefit ofthose players in the criminal justice 
system, often to the detriment of the average citizen, because horrific 
criminals do not receive the sentences they should.24 To some extent, 
such perceptions are unavoidable, but the increasing openness of the 
process should minimize these concerns significantly.25 
Unfortunately, the discussion of plea bargaining as an institution has 
not benefited from a similar increase in frankness about what the system 
actually entails. The most glaring example of this lack of frankness is 
the attempt to rationalize plea bargaining by claiming that it does not 
punish those who reject bargains but only benefits those who accept them. 
III. Punishment 
A defendant is charged with burglary in a state for which the punish-
ment can be as severe as seven years in prison or as lenient as a sentence 
of probation. The prosecutor offers the defendant a promise that, ifhe 
pleads guilty, the prosecutor will recommend a maximum of three years 
in prison. This offer is made despite the fact that the defendant has prior 
convictions for burglary and a misdemeanor larceny in the state, because 
the prosecutor wants to save the State the time, effort, and expense of 
trying the case, and because her case is relatively weak. The judge, wish-
ing to avoid a trial in part so other more pressing cases can be tried in his 
court, agrees that he will sentence the defendant to no more than the three 
years recommended by the prosecutor, should the defendant take the plea. 
The defendant rejects the plea, most likely because he thinks he can 
23 Craig M. Bradley & Joseph L. Hoffmann, People v. Simpson: Perspectives on 
the Implications for the Criminal Justice System: Public Perception, Justice, and the 
"Searchfor Truth" in Criminal Cases, 69 S. CAL. L. REv. 1267, 1292 (1996) (stating 
that "[p ]erhaps the least popular facet of the criminal justice system in the eyes of the 
American public is the widespread practice of plea-bargaining"). 
24 See, e.g., Richard Cockle, Father's Objections Delay Killer's Sentencing, THE 
OREGONIAN, Oct. 29, 2004, at C07; Steven J. Stark, Plea Bargain in Killing Angers 
Victim's Family; Lake Bluff Woman Shot in J 996 Double Slaying, CHI. TRIB., May 12, 
1998, at Metro Lake Ll. 
25 See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
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prevail at trial. Unfortunately for him, his belief proves wrong, and he 
is convicted of burglary by the jury. The judge, noting his prior felony 
conviction, speaks of how it is clear that the defendant has not learned 
his lesson and that he must be deterred from committing more burglaries. 
He then sentences the defendant to five years in prison for the burglary 
conviction. 
Two men are charged with robbery for having pointed guns at a 
woman and stealing her bag. The statute under which they are charged 
allows for sentences of imprisonment up to fifteen years in length. The 
two men are similar in age, background, and in all other factors that could 
playa role in determining how harshly a judge would sentence them. 
Each has a similar criminal record involving drug possessions and 
burglary. Defendant A pleads guilty after his attomeynegotiates with the 
prosecutor and receives five years in prison. Defendant B goes to trial, 
is convicted, and receives eight years in prison. 
Such scenarios are not only common but are the regular course of 
business for most criminal courts in this country.26 There are, of course, 
many instances when the difference in the sentence the defendant was 
offered before trial and the one he actually received after conviction are 
far larger than in the above scenarios.27 In one case, for instance, a 
26 Robert E. Scott, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1909-13 
(1992); Stephen 1. Schulhofer, Is Plea Bargaining Inevitable?, 97 HARV. L. REv. 1037, 
1037 (1984). According to a 1970 report by the Administrative Office of United States 
Courts, defendants who chose to plead guilty at their arraignment received average 
sentences of probation or less than one year of jail time, while those who elected jury 
trials received average sentences of three to four years in prison. Kipnis, supra note 
18, at 244. In another study, courts in Cuyahoga County, New York, found that half 
of the defendants who pleaded guilty received suspended prison sentences or fines, but 
those who went to trial received suspended sentences or fmes in fewer than one out of 
four cases. KATZ, supra note 19, at 207. Yet another study in Minneapolis noted that 
judges "look critically upon attorneys 'wasting the state's time with trials.' Moreover, 
they directly discourage not-guilty pleas by making their views known to attorneys and 
by tending to penalize defendants who go to trial with more severe sentences." MARTIN 
A. LEVIN, URBAN POLITICS AND THE CRIMINAL COURTS 72 (1977); see also COLE, supra 
note 2, at 423 (stating that courtroom mythology upholds the view that a penalty is 
extracted from defendants who take up the court's time). 
27 See, e.g., Hampton v. Wyrick, 588 F .2d 632 (8th Cir. 1978)( aflirming the sentence 
of fifty years after the defendant rejected a plea bargain with a recommended sentence 
of twenty-five years); Salazar v. Estelle, 547 F.2d 1226 (5th Cir. 1977) (aflirming a 
sentence of forty-five years after the defendant rejected the State's offer of a ten-year 
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defendant was offered a sentence of two to four, or six years incarceration 
if he accepted a plea. He turned it down, was convicted at trial, and 
sentenced to forty to eighty years in prison.28 The Supreme Court, in 
Bordenkircher v. Hayes,29 affirmed the sentence of a man who was 
offered five years in prison for a theft crime, rejected the offer, and then 
was re-indicted for the same charge, this time as a persistent felon. 
Convicted on the theft charge at trial, he received life imprisonment for 
a crime that would have resulted in five years in prison had he accepted 
the plea. 30 Although cases involving such gross differentials in sentencing 
occur, they are fairly rare. 31 Such cases dramatize the argument that 
differential sentencing is punishment for exercising the right to trial, but 
they are not necessary to demonstrate the point. Just the basic every day 
type of plea bargaining, as in the scenarios above, is sufficient to show 
punishment for exercising the right to trial. 
A. Benefit-Punishment 
One of the most facially appealing arguments against the notion that 
differential sentencing based on the decision to plead guilty or to go to 
trial is punishment for exercising a constitutional right is the one espous-
ing a benefit-punishment dichotomy. According to this approach, defen-
probated sentence and was found guilty at trial); State v. Korurn, 86 P.3d 166 (Wash. 
Ct. App.) (reversing the sentence ofa defendant who initially agreed to a plea deal of 
135 months in prison, withdrew his sentence, and received 1208 months in prison 
because the State filed an additional thirty-two counts), reh 'g granted, 101 P.3d 108 
(Wash. 2004); Davis v. State, 860 So. 2d 1058 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (reversing a 
sentence in which the defendant was offered four and a half years in prison but received 
fifteen years in prison after rejecting the State's offer and going to trial); State v. 
Baldwin, 629 P .2d. 222 (Mont. 1981) (remanding for re-sentencing the ten-year post-trial 
prison sentence of a defendant who was offered and rejected a plea in which the judge 
indicated the defendant would spend forty-five days in jail). 
28 People v. Dennis, 328 N.E.2d 135, 136 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975) (reversing a sentence 
after petitioner rejected a plea bargain of two to four years and received a sentence of 
forty to eighty years after being found guilty at trial). 
29 434 U.S. 357 (1978). 
30 Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 358-59. 
31 For example, a mere disparity between the sentence offered during plea negotia-
tions and the harsher sentence imposed after trial will not by itself lead to a re-
sentencing. Dennis, 328 N.E.2d at 138; Baldwin, 629 P.2d at 225. 
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dants who go to trial and receive a sentence greater than they would have 
received had they accepted the plea offered, actually received the sentence 
they deserved based on the crime committed and the defendant's back-
ground.32 Had they accepted the plea bargain, they would have received 
a benefit by getting sentenced to less than they deserved.33 
For example, in the scenarios offered above, the burglar who was sen-
tenced to five years in prison upon conviction at trial, afierrejecting a plea 
bargain offering him two years less time, ultimately received the sentence 
he deserved based on factors such as the crime committed and his back-
ground.34 The three-year sentence offered in exchange for his guilty plea 
was a discount, a break that he would have received for saving the system 
the time, effort, and expense ofhaving to prosecute him or whatever other 
justifications a judge might offer for differential sentencing.35 Similarly, 
32 See, e.g., Jung v. State, 145 N.W.2d 684 (Wis. 1966). The lung court stated that, 
even though the defendant received a higher sentence than his co-defendant after he 
chose to take the case to trial, it could not find that 
the trial judge was unreasonable in considering all participants, whether they carried 
a gun or not, as equally guilty of anned robbery. It was an organized adventure with 
all participants running the calculated risk that the gun a colleague carried might 
necessarily be used in the perpetration of the crime. Under this theory Jung, even 
though he did not have a gun in his possession, was also equally culpable of the 
attempted murder. On this view, [his co-defendant' s] sentence was too lenient, rather 
than Jung's being too severe. 
lung, 145 N.W.2dat 690; see State v. Goodale, 198 N.W.2d44, 50 (S.D. 1972)("We 
fmd neither error in the disparity of the sentence based upon a denial of a constitutional 
right nor abuse of discretion based upon the severity of the sentence. In our case as in 
lung, the defendant Goodale drove the getaway car, in fact was the owner. He was guilty 
of three criminal offenses when he appeared before the judge for sentencing. "); see also 
Salazar, 547 F.2dat 1227; People v. Moffitt, 485 N.E.2d513, 519 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985); 
Rogers v. State, 891 So. 2d 268, 271 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004). 
33 In United States v. Wiley, 184 F. Supp. 679, 685 (N.D. Ill. 1960), the defendant 
was convicted at trial to a harsher sentence than his co-perpetrators, who pled guilty, 
all of whom were more directly involved in the crime and had worse criminal records 
than Wiley. The argued, however, that "it is incorrect ... to say ... that 'a more severe 
sentence' is imposed on a defendant who stands trial. Rather, it seems more correct to 
me to say that the defendant who stands trial is sentenced without leniency according 
to law." [d.; see also United States v. Portillo-Valenzuela, 20 F.3d 393,394 (lOth Cir. 
1994); United States v. Jones, 997 F.2d 1475, 1477 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
34 See infra Section IV (addressing the goals of punishment that affect what factors 
judges consider relevant to crafting an appropriate sentence). 
35 McDONALD, supra note 20, at 93-94. 
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in the second scenario above, the robber who went to trial and received 
more prison time than his similarly situated co-perpetrator was not 
punished for exercising his right to trial. He received the sentence war-
ranted by the crime and his background, and the co-perpetrator got a 
reward for pleading guilty.36 The obvious appeal of such an explanation 
for differential sentencing is that it produces a win-win scenario and 
negates the assertion that he who decides to exercise his constitutional 
right to a trial is punished.37 The problem with this explanation is that 
it is deeply flawed on every level. 
1. Theoretical Level 
On a theoretical level, although not a practical one, there may be some 
basis for this justification if there was a given fixed sentence that 
accompanied each crime, or if the sentencing scheme gave the judge little 
or no discretion regarding what a sentence would be.38 Arguably, such 
a situation exists only with respect to specific mandatory minimum 
sentencing laws39 or to sentencing systems that use mandatory guide-
lines.40 For example, under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines as they 
existed before the Supreme Court decided that the guidelines were 
unconstitutional in their current form,41 a defendant would receive a 
36 See, e.g., United States v. Stevenson, 573 F.2d 1105, 1107 (9thCir. 1978); Wiley, 
184 F. Supp. at 687; Stanley v. State, 479 N.E.2d 1315,1318-19 (Ind. 1985). 
37 See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text. 
38 See, e.g., OR. REv. STAT. § 475.996 (2003) (setting drug sentences based on the 
amount of drugs involved); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9712 (West 1998) (listing 
minimum sentences for offenses committed with firearm); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170 
(West 2005) (establishing determinate sentencing). 
39 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2002); 21 U.S.C. § 844 (1996); 21 U.S.C. § 860 (1994) (setting 
minimum penalties for certain drug offenses); 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2004) (setting 
minimum penalties for carrying a firearm during or in relation to any crime of violence 
or drug trafficking) (recently held unconstitutional by United States v. Harris, 397 F.3d 
404 (6th Cir. 2005». 
40 See, e.g., Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2003) (recently 
held unconstitutional by United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005»; WASH. REv. 
CODE § 9.94A.OI0 (2003). 
41 See Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 759. In Booker, the Supreme Court determined that 
mandatory sentencing guidelines violate the rights to a jury trial and the requirement 
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sentence based on relatively few factors relating mostly to the seriousness 
of the crime committed and his criminal record.42 A point system was 
used to tally aggravating and mitigating sentencing factors.43 After 
totaling up the points, the judge would be required to mete out a sentence 
within a small range ofpossibilities.44 
Under such a system, it could be argued that there was a "regular" 
sentence that the defendant was to receive-within the range of guideline 
directed sentences. Ifhe chose to plead guilty, the discount the defendant 
received would be a reward, and the sentence he received after trial, if 
he eschewed the plea agreement, would not be punishment for opting to 
go to trial but merely the sentence he deserved.45 Similarly, if a statute 
called for a mandatory five-year penalty for conviction of a gun related 
crime, and the accused was offered a plea to the underlying offense 
without reference to a weapon, it could be argued that he would have 
received a reward for pleading guilty but would have received the regular 
sentence for gun related crimes if convicted after atrial. 46 
Even this assertion is open to challenge, however. Critics of manda-
tory sentencing guidelines and mandatory minimum sentences argue that 
such approaches do not reduce sentencing discretion as much as they 
merely transfer it fromjudges to prosecutors.47 Through decisions regard-
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt if they authorize the judge to enhance the 
defendant's sentence by making a new finding of fact without the aforementioned 
constitutional protections. Jd.; see also Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531,2538 
(2004) (holding in this case that the "State's sentencing procedure did not comply with 
the Sixth Amendment"). 
42 Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2003). 
43 Jd. § 3553(a)(4). 
44 Id. § 3553(a)-(b). 
4S KATZ, supra note 19, at 206-08. 
46 Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2004) (providing for a mandatory five-year 
minimum penalty for using or carrying a firearm during a crime of violence or drug 
trafficking and a twenty-five-year penalty for recidivists); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 
144 7(b) (2005) (providing that any person convicted of possession of a deadly weapon 
during commission of a felony may not receive a suspended sentence or be eligible "for 
good time, parole, or probation during the period of the sentence imposed"); FLA. STAT. 
ANN. § 775.087 (West 2005) (setting minimum sentences for possession or use of a 
weapon during a felony). 
47 See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for 
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ing what crimes to charge and at what level to charge them (decisions 
having much greater impact in mandatory systems where the judge cannot 
limit the exercise ofprosecutorial discretion through the use of ameliorat-
ing sentencing factors48), as well as determinations of which defendants 
to allow to get a sentencing benefit for cooperating with criminal 
investigations, the exercise of prosecutorial discretion can significantly 
impact what sentence a defendant receives in such a mandatory system. 49 
Therefore, even in such a system, prosecutors can and do exact a price 
for the defendant's decision to challenge the charges against him by going 
to trial.50 
When the discretionary decisions of prosecutors can so affect the 
ultimate sentence a defendant receives, the claim that there is a regular 
sentence for the commission of a specific crime is dubious, and the bene-
Less Aggregation, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 901, 926 (1991); Lightfoot, supra note 16, at 75; 
Laura Sager, Sentencing Law Symposium: Advocating for Change in Mandatory 
Minimum Sentencing, 16 T.M. COOLEYL. REv. 27, 32 (1999); Ian Weinstein, Fifteen 
Years After the Federal Sentencing Revolution: How Mandatory Minimums Have 
Undermined Effective and Just Narcotics Sentencing, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 87,92 
(2003). 
48 United States v. Roberts, 726 F. Supp. 1359, 1363 (D.D.C. 1989)("The sentencing 
statute has largely replaced the traditional role of judges in the critical sentencing phase 
of the criminal process by vesting most sentencing decisions in prosecutors, and that 
law and the guidelines issued pursuant thereto have thus effected what may be the most 
fundamental change in the criminal justice system to have occurred within the past 
generation. Indeed, the de facto transfer of much of the responsibility for sentencing 
from impartial judges to prosecutors has had the effect of disturbing the due process 
balance essential to the fairness of criminal litigation. "), rev' d, United States v. Mills, 
964 F.2d 1186 (D.C. Cir.1992); Alschuler, supra note 47, at 926 ("Indeed, a system of 
sentencing guidelines that on its face prescribes severe sentences but leaves plea 
bargaining unconstrained is a prosecutor's paradise. "); Lightfoot, supra note 16, at 75. 
49 See, e.g., Roberts, 726 F. Supp. at 1373 (discussing the impact of cooperation and 
the federal sentencing guidelines); Ian Weinstein, Regulating the Marketfor Snitches, 
47 BUFF. L. REV. 563, 563-64 (1999) ("These are boom times for the sellers and buyers 
of cooperation in the federal criminal justice system While prosecutors have always 
welcomed the assistance of snitches, tougher federal sentencing laws have led to a 
significant increase in cooperation as more defendants try to provide 'substantial 
assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person,' to have some chance 
of receiving a significant sentence reduction. "). 
so In one extreme case, the prosecutor filed an additional thirty-two counts against 
the defendant after he withdrew his guilty plea and went to trial. As a result, he received 
a sentence ten times longer than he would have gotten under his earlier guilty plea that 
was later withdrawn. State v. Korurn, 86 P.3d 166, 167 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004). 
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fit without punishment explanation for differential sentencing is unpersua-
sive. As argued below, even to the extent such mandatory sentencing 
systems can theoretically claim to offer benefits and eliminate punishment 
for the decision regarding whether to exercise the right to trial, that claim 
fails when examined in terms ofwhat actually happens in American penal 
systems. 5 I 
In sentencing systems in which most sentences are to some degree 
within the discretion of the trial judge, limited only by the range within 
the particular statute under which the defendant is being prosecuted, this 
punishment-benefit dichotomy fails theoretically as well as practically. 
Yet, the overwhelming number of defendants convicted of crimes in this 
country are sentenced under just this type of system. 52 In such cases, there 
can be no "regular" sentence because judges can factor in whatever sen-
tencing considerations they wish. Different judges use different factors 
in sentencing, or they weigh the same factors in entirely different ways. 53 
Even focusing on one judge, it is virtually impossible to say how he or 
she will sentence every defendant charged with a particular crime. 
Therefore, any suggestion that there is a "regular" sentence within such 
a discretionary sentencing system, even for individual judges, is flawed. 
Once one accepts the realization that there is no regular sentence for a 
given defendant who committed a particular crime, it is clear that the 
51 See infra subsection III(A)(2). 
52 THOMAS W. CHURCH, JR., In Defense of "Bargain Justice, " in CONTROVERSIES 
IN CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 18, at 265. 
53 This can be seen from the breadth and subjectivity of the factors typically used 
by judges in sentencing. One court offered the following sentencing factors: 
[A] proper sentence is a composite of many factors, including the nature of the 
offense, the circumstances (extenuating or aggravating) of the offense, the prior 
criminal record, if any, of the offender, the age of the offender, the record of the 
offender as to employment, the background of the offender with reference to 
education, home life, sobriety and social adjustment, the emotional and mental 
condition of the offender, the prospects for the rehabilitation of the offender, the 
possibility of a return of the offender to a normal life in the community, the 
possibility of treatment or of training of the offender, the possibility that the sentence 
may serve as a deterrent to crime by this offender, or by others, and the current 
community need, if any, for such a deterrent in respect to the particular type of 
offense involved. 
United States v. Betancourt, 405 F. Supp. 1063, 1064 (D. P.R. 1975). 
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different sentences ajudge gives to those who plead guilty and to those 
who go to trial can be viewed equally either as benefits or as punishments. 
When discussing this with my students, I tell them that I like when 
people agree with me. Accordingly, those students who express opinions 
during class that are similar to mine will be receiving a grade of A or B. 
Those students who disagree with me can get no higher than a C for the 
course. I explain to them that, before they go to the Dean to complain, 
I want to make clear that I am not punishing those students who disagree 
with me but merely rewarding those who have the wisdom to share my 
views. There are, of course, reasons for differential sentencing within 
our plea bargaining based criminal justice system that are far better than 
my reasons for differential grading outlined above,54 but the argument that 
one is any less punishment than the other is hard to fathom. 
The undeniable reality of plea bargaining is that, in the vast majority 
of cases, everything that could or should impact the severity of a sentence 
is the same regardless of whether the defendant pleads guilty or goes to 
trial. 55 The only variable is the defendant's decision to exercise his con-
stitutional right to trial. 56 There is no doubt, therefore, that the difference 
in the sentence he received is the existence of that one variable, the 
54 The fundamental rationale is the fear that taking too many cases to trial will 
overwhelm the criminal justice system. McDONALD, supra note 20, at 93. In Black/edge 
v. Allison, the Supreme Court stated: 
The defendant avoids extended pretrial incarceration and the anxieties and 
uncertainties of a trial; he gains a speedy disposition of his case, the chance to 
acknowledge his guilt, and a prompt start in realizing whatever potential there may 
be for rehabilitation. Judges and prosecutors conserve vital and scarce resources. 
The public is protected from the risks posed by those charged with criminal offenses 
who are at large on bail while awaiting completion of criminal proceedings. 
431 U.S. 63,71 (1977). Other benefits that come from getting defendants to avoid trial 
and plead guilty through sentencing and charge inducements are: allowing traumatized 
victims to avoid the further trauma of having to re-live the crime during direct and cross 
examination at trial, affording defendants a benefit that will induce them to cooperate 
in other criminal investigations, and providing in certain instances that the disposition 
ofa case reflects the actual seriousness of the crime and the culpability of the criminal 
rather than the all or nothing of a trial conviction on the top count of an indictment or 
a complete acquittal. 
5S See infra notes 67-93 and accompanying text. 
56 !d. 
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decision to go to trial. The attempt to create a dichotomy between benefit 
and punishment based on the existence or lack of this one variable is 
unhelpful and without real meaning. Theoretically, it is equally punish-
ment and benefit. What matters is not the label placed upon it, but the 
fact that a defendant can have his freedom deprived for a longer period 
of time solely because he exercises his right to trial. 
2. Practical Level 
If one looks at this issue in a more practical way, the argument for a 
reward-punishment dichotomy is even weaker in all types of American 
penal systems. Roughly ninety percent of criminal cases in this country 
are disposed of without trials.57 The vast majority of those are settled 
through pleas of guilt from criminal defendants, invariably offered in 
exchange for charge or sentencing reductions. 58 Seen in this practical 
light, the argument that the sentence the defendant receives after trial is 
his "regular" sentence and the one imposed upon him after he pleads 
guilty is his "reward" sentence is even less convincing. To accept this, 
one must come to regard the sentence in the ten percent ofthe cases that 
go to trial (actually the even fewer than this ten percent that result in 
convictions) as the regular sentence, and the ones in the almost ninety 
percent disposed of through guilty pleas as the reward sentences. So, if 
my class described above has twenty students in it, two will get the 
"regular" grade of C or below, whereas the other eighteen will be 
"rewarded" for agreeing with me and receive an A or a B. How foolish 
of those two students to think that they are being punished. 
It is illuminating to see how the Supreme Court dealt with and rejected 
the logic of benefit without punishment in a situation very similar to 
differential sentencing in our plea bargaining or trial system. In Roberts 
v. United States,59 the issue was whether the defendant's failure to reveal 
others who were involved with him in dealing drugs could be used against 
S7 See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 2, at 9. 
S8 See United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 772 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting); 
see also MCDONALD, supra note 20, at 93. 
S9 445 U.S. 552, 555-56 (1980). 
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him at sentencing. Roberts pleaded guilty to conspiracy and remained 
incarcerated for two years pending his appeal. 60 Defense counsel 
requested that Roberts receive a sentence that would enable him to be 
released immediately.61 The Government argued that Roberts should be 
sentenced to "substantial" prison time in part because of his failure to 
cooperate with the investigation of related criminal activities.62 The 
district court sentenced Roberts to more prison time, offering his failure 
to cooperate with the investigation as one of its grounds for doing SO.63 
Roberts' appeal made it to the Supreme Court. 
In the Supreme Court, Roberts' attorney argued that, while cooperation 
by a criminal defendant was a laudable activity that could be rewarded 
at sentencing, failure to cooperate should not result in punishment such 
as a longer prison sentence. 64 In rejecting this reward-punishment 
dichotomy, the Court wrote, 
We doubt that a principled distinction may be drawn between "enhancing" 
the punishment imposed upon the petitioner and denying him the 'leniency' 
he claims would be appropriate if he had cooperated. The question for 
decision is simply whether a petitioner's failure to cooperate is relevant to 
the currently understood goals of sentencing.65 
Applying the Supreme Court's words to differential sentencing based 
on the decision to exercise one's right to trial demonstrates how that same 
logic should prevail. Consider the Supreme Court's words so applied: 
We doubt that a principled distinction may be drawn between "enhanc-
ing" the punishment imposed upon the petitioner and denying him the 
"leniency" he claims would be appropriate if he decided to plead guilty 
and forego his right to trial. The question for decision is simply whether 
petitioner's failure to plead guilty and exercise his right to trial is relevant 
to the currently understood goals of sentencing. 
60 Roberts, 445 U.S. at 554-55. 
61 Id. at 555. 
62 !d. 
63 Id. at 555-56. 
64 See id. at 557. 
65 Id. 
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IV. Goals of Punishment 
Once it is acknowledged that differential sentencing is a fonn of 
punishment for exercising the right to trial, such a practice could still be 
defended if it was the result of applying one or more of the traditional 
goals of sentencing. The task then is to detennine ifthere is some reason 
for plea-based differential sentencing, which is derived from accepted 
punishment goals, that explains how severely or leniently we sentence 
those convicted of crimes. These traditional goals ofpunishment are retri-
bution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.66 The first three of 
these goals offer no support for differential sentencing, and the theoretical 
support offered by rehabilitation collapses almost entirely when analyzed 
in tenns of what really happens when pleas of guilty are negotiated and 
accepted. 
Retribution, often called "just deserts,,,67 seeks to create a punishment 
commensurate with the crime.68 That is, the severity ofthe punishment 
should be based on the seriousness ofthe crime. This seriousness to many 
retributionists is detennined by assessing the degree of harm done and 
the level of moral turpitUde of the wrongdoer.69 Unlike the other three 
theories of punishment, retribution is largely non-utilitarian.70 That is, 
its goal is to right a moral wrong, to salve a societal wound caused by the 
66 NICHOLAS N. KmRIE & ELYCE H. ZENOFF, SANCTIONS, SENTENCING, AND 
CORRECTIONS 19-54 (1981); Mary Sigler, Contradiction, Coherence, and Guided Dis-
cretion in the Supreme Court's Capital Sentencing Jurisprudence, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 
1151, 1154 (2003). 
67 JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, RETRIBUTION RECONSIDERED 21-24 (1992). 
68 ANDREW VON HIRSCH, PAST OR FUTURE CRIMES: DESERVEDNESS AND DANGER-
OUSNESS IN THE SENTENCING OF CRIMINALS 31 (1987). 
691d. at 64. von Hirsch defmes harm as "the injury done or risked by the criminal 
act." Id. In assessing wrongfulness, he looks to "the factors of intent, motive and 
circumstance." !d.; see also Thomas E. Baker & Fletcher N. Baldwin, Jr., Eighth 
Amendment Challenges to the Length of a Criminal Sentence: Following the Supreme 
Court "From Precedent to Precedent", 27 ARIZ. L. REv. 25, 69 (1985); Bruce W. 
Gilchrist, Note, Disproportionality in Sentences of Imprisonment, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 
1119, 1125 (1979). 
70 JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, RETRffiUTION, JUSTICE AND THERAPY 151-52 (1979); 
HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 10-11 (1968); LEON 
RADZINOWICZ, IDEOWGY AND CRIME 115 (1966). 
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defendant when he committed the crime.71 If in doing so the punishment 
makes it less likely the defendant will recidivate, that is well and good. 
The purpose ofa retribution-based punishment, however, is independent 
of this and other utilitarian goals.72 Retribution-based punishments, 
therefore, call for some kind of proportional relationship between the 
seriousness ofthe crime and the harshness ofthe punishment.73 For the 
most part, retributionists argue against focusing on the criminal and look 
primarily, if not exclusively, to the crime committed.74 
There is no retribution-based reason for differential sentencing between 
those who plead guilty and those who are convicted after trial. In fact, any 
such difference would be antithetical to retributionist principles.75 Ob-
viously, whatever criteria are used to measure the seriousness of the 
offense remain the same regardless ofhow the case is ultimately disposed. 
Put in the simplest of retributionist terms, one who goes to trial does not 
deserve a heavier sentence than one who pleads guilty to the same 
offense. 
71 MURPHY, supra note 70, at 229; C.L. TEN, CRIME, GUILT AND PUNISHMENT: A 
PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION 52-53 (1987). 
72 MURPHY, supra note 67, at 21. In expressing this view held by the retributionist, 
another conunentator wrote: 
Judicial punishment can never be used as a means to promote some other good for 
the criminal himself or for civil society, but instead it must in all cases be imposed 
on him only on the ground that he has committed a crime; for a human being can 
never be manipulated merely as a means to the purposes of someone else and can 
never be confused with the objects of the law of things. 
IMMANUEL KANT, MET APHYSICALELEMENTS OF JUSTICE: PART I OF THE METAPHYSICS 
OF MORALS 138 (John Ladd ed. & trans., 1999) (1797). 
73 MURPHY, supra note 70, at 232; see also C.S. Lewis, The Humanitarian Theory 
of Punishment, in CONTEMPORARY PUNISHMENT: VIEWS, EXPLANATIONS, AND 
JUSTIFICATIONS 195 (Rudolph J. Gerber & Patrick D. McAnanyeds., 1972) (arguing 
that the "concept of Desert is the only connecting link between punishment and justice"). 
74 In his landmark book explaining the classical school of punishment, Italian 
criminologist Cesare Beccaria argued that punishments should be based not on who the 
offender was or his status in society, but instead on the particular crime committed. 
CESARE BECCARIA, AN ESSAY ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 82 (Henry Paulucci trans., 
1991) (1764). Some retributionists would allow, however, for consideration of a 
defendant's prior criminal record. 
75 Retributionists believe in proportioning the sentence to the seriousness of the 
crime. See Lewis, supra note 73. 
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There are two types of deterrence that are traditionally used as justifi-
cations for punishment. The goal of general deterrence is to use this 
defendant's case and punishment to create a disincentive to others think-
ing of committing similar crimes. 76 Proponents of deterrence view crime 
as a rational act with potential criminals considering whether the reward 
they will get from their potential crime, be it pecuniary or emotional, 
outweighs the pain that will ensue if they are caught and punished.77 A 
sentence focused on general deterrence should be stiff enough to serve 
as a disincentive for others similarly situated to the defendant to commit 
such a crime, because the severity ofthe sentence outweighs the benefit 
of the crime to the potential criminal.78 There is nothing in the decision 
of whether to plead guilty or go to trial that makes any difference as to 
what sentence the defendant should receive when the sentence is based 
on principles of general deterrence. 79 
The second type of deterrence is special or specific deterrence. The 
goal here is to make the sentence harsh enough so that the defendant 
before the court has a significant disincentive to offend again.80 The tar-
get with specific deterrence is the defendant himself; again, his punish-
ment should be harsh enough to outweigh the benefits of his engaging 
in similar criminal activity.81 Once again, the goals of specific deterrence 
offer no justification for different sentences to be imposed on those who 
plead guilty and those who go to trial. That is, unless what society wishes 
to deter is the defendant's exercise of his right to trial, which would be 
76 PACKER, supra note 70, at 39 & 140; VON HIRSCH, supra note 68, at 32; see also 
United States v. BIarek, 7 F. Supp. 2d 192, 202 (E.D.N.Y.) (discussing Jeremy 
Bentham's espousal of general deterrence), ajJ'd, 166 F.3d 1202 (2d Cir. 1998). 
77 H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 133 (1968); PACKER, supra note 
70, at 40-41. 
78 RADZINOWICZ, supra note 70, at 10-11. See generally Johannes Andenaes, The 
General Preventive Effects of Punishment, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 949 (1966). 
79 Andenaes, supra note 78, at 970; KrITRIE & ZENOFF, supra note 66, at 13 (quoting 
J.M. Burns & J.S. Mattina, Sentencing, in RENO: NAT ' LJUDICIAL COLL. , ABA AT UNIV. 
OF NEV. 1-5 (1978». 
80 Steven Grossman, Proportionality in Non-Capital Sentencing: The Supreme 
Court's Tortured Approach to Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 84 Ky. L.J. 107, 164 
n. 361 (1995-96). 
81 KITTRIE & ZENOFF, supra note 66, at 12; PACKER, supra note 70, at 45. 
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an entirely different kind of deterrence and one that would constitute 
punishment for exercising the right to trial. 82 
Incapacitationists believe that there are some criminal offenders so 
dangerous that they need to be kept separated from the pUblic.83 Sen-
tences meted out to achieve the goals of incapacitation are based on the 
seriousness of the crime and especially on the perceived continuing 
danger these particular criminals pose.84 Such sentences are designed to 
remove the offender from society until and unless he no longer poses such 
a grave danger. 85 Whether a mass murderer or serial pedophile pleads 
guilty or goes to trial surely bears no relationship to how dangerous he 
will be when released back into society. 
Rehabilitation as a goal or theory of punishment should not be con-
fused with the programs within or outside of prisons that may be designed 
to help rehabilitate a defendant. Programs that offer vocational or 
educational training to inmates and those that provide psychological or 
substance abuse counseling are designed, in one way or another, to help 
deal with the problems that may be underlying the defendant's criminal 
behavior. One can believe in the creation and support of such programs 
without being a rehabilitationist.86 This is because rehabilitation as a 
theory of punishment requires that the severity of the punishment be based 
primarily on how long it will take and what conditions will be needed for 
the defendant to be rehabilitated.87 Rehabilitationists focus more on the 
criminal than the crime and try to craft a sentence that is tied to the needs 
of the individual who committed the crime.88 The chief concerns of the 
82 See infra notes 110-22 and accompanying text. 
83 TEN, supra note 71, at 8. 
84 Steven Grossman & Stephen Shapiro, Judicial Modification of Sentences in 
Maryland, 33 U. BALT. L. REv. 1,20 (2003). 
85 KmRIE & ZENOFF, supra note 66, at 13; TEN, supra note 71, at 8. 
86 See, e.g., United States v. Bergman, 416 F. Supp. 496,499 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) 
(involving sentencing expert Judge Marvin Frankel, who criticized sending someone 
to prison to further the goal of rehabilitation, but supported making rehabilitative 
programs available once someone is imprisoned for another reason). 
87 AM. FRIENDS SERVo COMM., STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE: A REpORT ON CRIME AND 
PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 84 (1971); PACKER, supra note 70, at 14. 
88 See Craig Peyton Gaumer, Punishment for Prejudice: A Commentary on the 
Constitutionality and Utility of State Statutory Responses to the Problems of Hate 
Crimes, 39 S.D. L. REv. 1,42 n.239 (1994). 
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rehabilitationist are (1) what type of help the defendant will need to avoid 
committing crimes in the future, and (2) how long the defendant will need 
to be incarcerated in order for that rehabilitation to work. 89 
Some who argue that differential sentencing is not punishment for 
exercising the right to trial claim to find support in rehabilitation as a 
justification for determining sentences.90 They argue that when a defen-
dant pleads guilty, the acceptance of responsibility said to be embodied 
in his plea is the first step on the road to rehabilitation.91 Such an 
argument is modeled loosely on the approaches of some rehabilitative 
organizations, such as the Twelve Steps of Alcoholics Anonymous 
(AA).92 The first step in many such rehabilitative programs is to acknowl-
edge the existence ofa problem in your life.93 Some argue that the plea 
of guilty is the criminal justice equivalent of this acknowledgment and 
demonstrates an acceptance of responsibility.94 As the defendant has 
acknowledged responsibility by pleading guilty, he has taken the first step 
on the road to rehabilitation and therefore will need less time for his 
rehabilitation to be completed.95 Thus, the defendant who pleads guilty 
warrants a lighter sentence than the accl!sed who goes to trial. 
89 AM. FRIENDS SERVo COMM., supra note 87, at 84; PACKER, supra note 70, at 14. 
90 HEUMANN, supra note 17, at 66; see also NORA DEMLEITNER ET AL., SENTENCING 
LAW AND POLICY: CASES, STATUTES, AND GUIDELINES 314 n.l (2004). 
91 See, e.g., Brady V. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 753 (1970) (stating that a 
defendant "demonstrates by his plea that he is ready and willing to admit his crime and 
to enter the correctional system in a frame of mind that affords hope for success in 
rehabilitation over a shorter period of time than might otherwise be necessary"); see also 
Michael M. O'Hear, Symposium, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Ten Years 
Later-Remorse, Cooperation, and "Acceptance of Responsibility": The Structure, 
Implementation, and Reform of Section 3EI.1 of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 
91 Nw. U. L. REv. 1507 (1997). O'Hear notes that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
allow for a reduction in sentence to a defendant who "clearly demonstrates acceptance 
of responsibility for his offense." /d. at 1508. "Judges grant the acceptance-of-respon-
sibility adjustment in the vast majority of cases." /d. at 1510. 
92 Alcoholics Anonymous World Services, Inc., The Twelve Steps of Alcoholics 
Anonymous, at http://www.aa.org/default/en _services _ aa _ sub.cfm?subpageid=44& 
pageid=34 (revised May 9,2002). 
93/d. 
94 United States V. Speed Joyeros, 204 F. Supp. 2d 412, 433 (E.D.N.Y. 2002); 
UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3El.l(a) & (b) (2003). 
95 DEMLEITNER supra note 91, at 314 n.l; see also State V. Tieman, 645 A.2d 482, 
483 (R.I. 1994). 
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Accepting this proposition requires accepting the corollary that one 
who opts to exercise his constitutional right to trial is less likely to be 
rehabilitated or will take longer time to do so. One primary reason why 
defendants forego pleading guilty is because they or their attorneys 
believe they have a substantial chance of being acquitted96-perhaps 
because of perceived weakness in the prosecutor's case, legal issues sur-
rounding the charges or certain pieces of evidence, or even the defen-
dant's belief in his innocence.97 Does the decision of such a defendant 
to choose a trial suggest that he will take longer to be rehabilitated, or 
merely that he was convinced that the decision to go to trial was in his 
best interest? 
The primary reason that "the first step on the road to rehabilitation" 
argument fails to explain differential sentencing is that the motivation for 
pleading guilty is different in almost all caSes than the motivation neces-
sary for traditional rehabilitative programs like AA. Programs that use 
approaches such as The Twelve Steps require that the person in need of 
help really wants to be helped. That person's primary motivation must 
be the desire to get better.98 In such a case, acknowledging that one has 
a problem is, arguably, a necessary first step to being able to be treated 
for that problem.99 
Undoubtedly there are some defendants who plead guilty because they 
are genuinely repentant for what they did and wish to acknowledge their 
wrongdoing.loo In the real world, however, such defendants are few and 
far between. 101 Stated simply, virtually all defendants who accept guilty 
96 G. NICHOLAS HERMAN, PLEA BARGAINING § 2:03(1), at 8 (1997). 
97Id. Additionally, defense attorneys often feel the pressures of heavy caseloads, 
and sometimes this leads them to want to "turn over" cases quickly. Accordingly they 
may tend to encourage their clients to accept plea bargains rather than going to trial. 
HEUMANN, supra note 17, at 25. 
98 Alcoholics Anonymous World Services, Inc., A Newcomer Asks, athttp://www.aa. 
orgldefaultlen_about_aa.cfm?pageid=10 (last visited Aug. 12,2005). 
99 See supra note 92. 
100 McDONALD, supra note 20, at 102; see also Ex parte Fletcher, 849 So. 2d 900, 
903 (Ala. 2001) (explaining that defendant's repentant attitude contributed significantly 
in the court's decision). 
101 Note, The Influence of the Defendant's Plea on Judicial Determination of 
Sentencing, 66 YALE L.J. 204, 210 (1956). 
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pleas do so because they believe it will be in their best interest to do so. 102 
Even the few defendants who do feel some degree of remorse for their 
actions plead guilty primarily, ifnot exclusively, because ofthe sentenc-
ing considerations they will receive as a condition of their plea. 103 It 
hardly comes as a surprise that so few defendants plead guilty without 
some form of consideration from the prosecutor or the judge, or at least 
the belief that such a consideration might be forthcoming. To maintain 
that the desire to accept responsibility for their misdeeds motivates 
defendants who plead guilty, one would have to believe that a fairly direct 
correlation existed between the reduction in charge or prison time that 
a defendant is offered in exchange for his plea of guilty and the defen-
dant's sudden desire to acknowledge his wrongdoing. 
That almost all criminal defendants are acting purely in their own 
perceived self-interest in deciding whether to accept a plea bargain is 
hardly newsworthy. 104 Most litigants before a court do so even when the 
stakes are less than having thett liberty taken from them. 105 Were one 
group oflitigants to be disinclined to act in their own self-interest, it is 
hard to imagine a group less likely to fall into that category than criminal 
defendants. It comes as no great revelation, therefore, that both prosecu-
tors and criminal defense attorneys recognize the actual reason why 
almost all defendants choose to plead guilty-to receive some form of 
sentencing or other consideration from the court. 106 Though it is doubtful 
102 McDONALD, supra note 20, at 101. 
103Id. at 93-94. In his study, McDonald found that only two defendants mentioned 
that their guilty pleas were at all attributable to moral guilt, and even these two referred 
as well to the facts that "the cases against them were strong and that their attorneys had 
advised them to plead guilty. Id. at 102. 
104 As one commentator notes, "[t]he guilty plea therefore is primarily used for 
reasons of absolute self-interest and expediency rather than principle." KITTRIE & 
ZENOFF, supra note 66, at 425 (2d ed. 2002) (quoting HEDIEH NASHERI, BETRAYAL OF 
DUE PROCESS: A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF PLEA BARGAINING IN THE UNITED 
STATES AND CANADA (1998)). 
lOS Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychology, Economics, and Settlement: A 
New Look at the Role of the Lawyer, 76 TEX. L. REv. 77, 80-81 (1997) (discussing 
factors that motivate civil litigants to settle). 
106 KATZ, supra note 19, at 197-98 (stating that a reduction in sentence is the primary 
goal of plea negotiations); Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of 
Trial, 117 HARv.L.REv. 2463, 2496-97 (2004) (discussing how the defendant's interests 
shape his plea bargaining). 
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that a plea of guilty, even theoretically, can be equated to taking the first 
step on the road to rehabilitation, it is quite clear that almost all defen-
dants who choose to plead guilty do so for reasons having nothing to do 
with any such step on any such road. 107 
Pleading guilty is not the first step on the road to rehabilitation for 
virtually any criminal defendant. As with the other three justifications 
for determining the severity of a sentence, it provides no support for why 
defendants who are convicted after exercising their right to trial spend 
longer time in prison than they would have had they accepted the plea 
bargain that they were offered. 
Some have suggested that one justification for differential sentencing 
is that the judge learns more during a trial about the defendant and the 
seriousness of the crime committed, information presumably the judge 
would not learn sufficiently during the allocution that accompanies a plea 
of guilty. \08 However, as one author of a study of plea bargaining has 
noted, "the problem with this rationale is that it explains too much. It may 
fit some crimes of violence where heinous acts were committed but is 
unlikely to account for the vast majority of differential sentences."I09 
v. Risk 
Some have sought to justify the punishment defendants receive for 
choosing to exercise their right to trial by employing some sort of risk-
reward analysis. The highly respected Judge David Bazelon offered such 
a justification in Scott v. United States. I 10 
Judge Bazelon conceded that, when a defendant receives a greater 
sentence for going to trial than he would have gotten had he chosen to 
plead guilty, at least a component of his increased sentence is punishment 
for exercising a constitutional right. II I It was Judge Bazelon's view, 
however, that a portion ofthis difference in sentencing could be attributed 
107 Scott v. United States, 419 F.2d 264,271 n.33 (D.C. Cir. 1969). 
108 Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 801 (1989). 
109 MCDONALD, supra note 20, at 94. 
110 419 F.2d 264,276-78 (D.C. Cir. 1969). 
III Scott, 419 F.2d at 270-71. 
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to the fact that the defendant took a risk and lost. I 12 That is, the defendant 
had a certain offer of a reduced sentence had he accepted the plea offered, 
but he chose instead to risk a heavier sentence in the hopes of winning 
a full acquittal at trial. In Judge Bazelon's opinion, though there was no 
justification in punishing the defendant based on the defendant's refusal 
to save the criminal justice system the time and money needed for a trial, 
it is acceptable to make the accused pay the price for taking a risk and 
10sing.l 13 
In order to put his theory into practice, Judge Bazelon suggested the 
use of a formula to determine if a plea offer was the equivalent of punish-
ment for exercising the right to trial or merely the price paid by the 
accused for taking a risk and losing. Bazelon's approach was to assess 
how much prison time the defendant should receive for his crime based 
on accepted justifications for punishment, then estimate the likelihood 
that the prosecutor would win a conviction at trial. I 14 Under Bazelon' s 
approach, one would presumably mUltiply the appropriate sentence by 
the percentage of a likely conviction. I IS The defendant could then be sen-
tenced under a plea agreement to no less prison time than the result of 
that multiplication. 116 For example, if a defendant should receive ten 
years in prison based on the crime committed and other sentencing factors 
and there is a sixty percent likelihood of conviction after trial, then the 
sentence imposed based on a plea bargain could be six years or greater. 
Any less of a sentence offered in consideration for the defendant's plea 
of guilty would constitute punishment for exercising his right to trial. 117 
To Judge Bazelon, only the risk factor could justify differential sentenc-
ing. 
Judge Bazelon' s approach is interesting because it constitutes judicial 
acknowledgment that differential sentencing does embody punishment 
for exercising the right to trial, and it is a creative attempt to devise a plea 




116 [d. at 276-77. 
117 See id. 
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bargaining method that avoids such punishment. But it too is flawed both 
theoretically and practically. 
Theoretically, Judge Bazelon never makes a convincing case as to why 
factoring in the risk of conviction negates the fact that differential sen-
tencing is still punishment for exercising the right to trial. It is still true 
that the only difference between the defendant who receives six years in 
prison and the one who gets ten in the above scenario is the decision of 
the latter to seek trial. It is hard to avoid characterizing such a difference 
as a punishment. I IS Judge Bazelon claims that it is not the decision to go 
to trial that is being punished but merely that the system is exacting a 
price because, in looking for an acquittal, the defendant took a risk and 
10St.119 Why is it, though, that a defendant who takes a risk and loses 
should get more time in prison than one who pleads guilty? Surely taking 
such a risk in no way argues for more prison time in order to achieve the 
purposes of retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, or rehabilitation. 120 
Even accepting arguendo Judge Bazelon's argument that his approach 
does not punish for exercising the right to trial, it still punishes for taking 
a risk and losing. What sentencing justification is there for such a 
penalty? 
On a practical level, Judge Bazelon's theory is unworkable. Even 
assuming the good faith of whoever is to determine the likelihood of 
conviction after trial, such a figure cannot be reduced to a flat percentage. 
Although strong government cases can often be distinguished from 
weaker ones, too many variables exist and too much remains unknown 
at the time a plea would be offered to be able to quantify the likelihood 
of conviction at trial with any degree of accuracy. 121 Additionally, the 
mechanics of working out a system that addresses the many questions-
such as how the likelihood figure would be determined (that is, how to 
factor in the number of witnesses, their credibility, the reliability of 
identification testimony, admissions by the defendant, and the availability 
and strength of physical evidence, not to mention whatever evidence the 
118 See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text. 
119 Scott, 419 F.2d at 270-71. 
120 See supra notes 67-93 and accompanying text. 
121 See McDONALD, supra note 20, at 61-91. 
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defense would present to counteract the government's case122), should 
the prosecutor determine this number him or herself, and what the right 
of the defendant is to appeal from such a determination-would seem 
insurmountable. 
VI. Knowledge of the Parties Involved 
In order to make the current system of plea bargaining work, not only 
must defendants be punished for exercising their right to trial, but also 
all of the interested parties-the prosecutor, the defense attorney, the 
defendant, and the judge-must be fully aware that such a result is virtually 
inevitable in all criminal cases. No competent defense attorney would 
have her client plead guilty when the client derives no benefit from doing 
SO.123 One never knows what will happen at trial-what witnesses will fail 
to appear or reveal on the witness stand major credibility problems, what 
the absence of certain physical evidence will mean to the jury, or what 
will occur ifthe jury happens to contain a juror loathe to convict for his 
own personal reasons. 124 These and other variables make conviction after 
1221d. 
123 Katz, supra note 19, at 202-03. Usually the defendant follows the attorney's 
advice. ld. One author points out that differential sentencing is the "primary force 
behind plea bargaining. . .. Defendants plead guilty because they believe that if they 
stood trial they would be punished more severely. This incentive underlies almost all 
plea bargains .... " McDONALD, supra note 20, at 93. 
Moreover, the failure to try to negotiate a plea bargain that would benefit the 
defendant may constitute ineffective assistance of counsel if the failure leads to a 
showing of prejudice. HERMAN, supra note 96, § 3:03, at 19. In Cole v. Slayton, for 
instance, a Virginia federal district court granted petitioner's writ of habeas corpus 
because his defense attorney had not done enough to represent his client, including 
attemptingapleabargain. 378F. Supp. 364 (D. Va. 1974). The court noted that defense 
counsel believed he "had nothing to bargain with." ld. at 368. 
ld. 
This explanation ignores the fact that all defendants, no matter how overwhelming 
their guilt, have one bargaining point-the plea itself. Whether a prosecutor will agree 
to accept a plea of guilty in return for a reduced charge or recommended sentence 
will, of course, depend upon any of a number of factors, but the point is that this 
possibility should have been attempted. 
124 KATZ, supra note 19, at 191; see also supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
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trial less than a certainty. Even where the evidence is overwhelming 
against the defendant, why should he not take even the smallest chance 
at an acquittal ifthere is no benefit to forgoing his right to trial? 
In very rare cases, a defendant may wish to plead guilty without so 
much as the reasonable hope of a reduced sentence for having done so. 125 
For example, a defendant might fear or loathe the trial process, or he 
might feel genuine contrition and wish to acknowledge his guilt as soon 
as possible. 126 Such things undoubtedly occur but are very rare. 127 
Without the promise or reasonable beliefthat they will receive a sentenc-
ing reduction for doing so, very few defendants will plead guilty, and very 
few attorneys will counsel their clients to do so. 
Sentencing considerations given in exchange for the defendant's plea 
of guilty take many forms, often according to each jurisdiction' s law and 
the practices and policies of individual judges and prosecutors. 128 At 
times, the prosecutor will agree to drop the greater charge ifthe defendant 
125 See, e.g., Argot v. State, 583 S.E.2d 246, 248 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) (stating that 
"the record clearly demonstrates that Argot understood that there was no agreement as 
to sentencing, and that she could receive a maximum sentence of 20 years"); Steve 
Arney, Waukegan Man Pleads Guilty to Reckless Homicide, PANTAGRAPH, Nov. 15, 
1996, at A6 (reporting that the defendant "received no promises ofleniency in pleading 
guilty"); Ray Huard, Man Admits to Guilt in Death of Pedestrian, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIB., Feb. 24, 2005, at B-4: 7 (reporting that prosecutors made no promises in exchange 
for the defendant's guilty plea); Brittany Wallman & Ann W. 0 'Neill, Mortgage Fraud 
Investigation Is a Tale of Family Ties, SUN-SENTINEL, Apr. 2, 2005, at 1B (stating that 
the defendants will plead guilty but prosecutors made "no promises" about the sentence 
they would receive); cj COLE, supra note 2, at418 (stating that some defendants plead 
guilty without entering into negotiations before making the plea). 
126 See, e.g., State v. Paris, 578 S.E.2d 751, 752 (S.C. Ct. App. 2003) (noting that 
"[the defendant] said he knew the crime had not happened but was not going to contest 
the charge because he did not feel like putting his child through a trial"); Arney, supra 
note 125, at A6 (reporting that the defendant chose to plead guilty because he has "deep 
sorrow for the deaths of these two young women and believed it was in both his best 
interest and their family'S that he plead guilty to the charges"); Barton Gellman, Murder 
Defendant Now Says He's Guilty; 3 Days Into Trial, Maryland Man Drops Defense, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 24, 1989, at Bl (When the judge asked why the defendant wanted 
to plead guilty, the defendant said, "I don't wish to put anybody through any more than 
they have already been through," referring to his victims and his own family.). 
127 KATZ, supra note 19, at 197-98 (creating an inference that a reduction in sentence 
is the primary goal of plea negotiations); see supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
128 25 AM. JUR. Trials § 9, at 69 (2004). 
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pleads guilty to a lesser charge. 129 At other times, the defendant bargains 
to have the prosecutor make a specific recommendation to the sentencing 
judge or a recommendation that the sentence not exceed a certain 
maximum. l3O It is fair to say that, although exceptions do occur, it is the 
general practice of most judges not to exceed the prosecutor's recommen-
dation.131 For a judge to do otherwise, on a routine basis, would signifi-
cantly diminish the likelihood of guilty pleas in her courtroom. Some-
times the prosecutor's agreement merely to remain silent or make no 
recommendations as to sentence is enough to induce the defendant to 
plead guilty.132 
Judges may agree to a certain sentence as part ofthe plea agreement 
or commit themselves to a sentence only if some condition that they 
impose is fulfilled. 133 The judge may solely commit to not go beyond a 
certain maximum in her sentence. l34 Often times, a judge will make no 
commitment, but the defendant is induced to plead guilty because the 
judge's sentence either must be lower or is likely to be lower due to the 
129 HERMAN, supra note 96, § 6: 10(1 )-(3), at 68; KmRIE & ZENOFF, supra note 66, 
at 167. 
130 FED. R. CRIM. P. II(c); HERMAN, supra note 96, § 6:10(6) & (11), at 68-69; 
KmRIE & ZENOFF, supra note 66, at 167. 
131 PRESIDENT'SCOMM'N, supra note 2, at 11; KATZ, supra note 19, at208. Judges 
may also go along with the plea "in order to maintain future exchange relationships." 
COLE, supra note 2, at 422; HUEMANN, supra note 16, at 152. 
132 HERMAN, supra note 96, § 6:10(6), at 68-69; KITTRIE &ZENOFF, supra note 66, 
at 167; see, e.g., Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971). 
133 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (c); 25 AM. JUR. Trials § 9, at 69 (2004); see also, e.g., United 
States v. Phaneuf, 91 F.3d 255, 263 (1st Cir. 1996) ("A sentencing judge has broad 
discretion to impose special conditions of release that are 'reasonably related' to (1) the 
defendant's offense, history and characteristics; (2) the need for adequate deterrence; 
and (3) the need to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant."); People 
v. Buttram, 69 P.3d420, 430 (Cal. 2003) ("[B]ynegotiating only a maximum term, the 
parties leave to judicial discretion the proper sentencing choice within the agreed limit. 
Unless the agreement itself specifies otherwise, appellate issues relating to this reserved 
discretion are therefore outside the plea bargain and cannot constitute an attack upon 
its validity. "). 
134 See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. II(c); State v. Howard, 842 So. 2d 1233, 1238, (La. 
App. 2003) ("Where a defendant has pled guilty to an offense which does not adequately 
describe his conduct or has received a significant reduction in potential exposure to 
confmement through a plea bargain, the trial court has great discretion in imposing even 
the maximum sentence possible for the pled offense. "). 
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defendant's plea to a lesser charge. 13S Regardless ofthe form the induce-
ment takes, the defendant will invariably get some tangible sentencing 
benefit or at least the reasonable hope that he will benefit in exchange for 
his plea of guilty. 
A defendant who fails to accept a plea bargain and is convicted at trial 
will inevitably receive a heavier sentence than he would likely have gotten 
with the plea. 136 This is almost implicit in the plea bargaining process. 
Whether one calls this a punishment for going to trial137 or the failure to 
receive a benefit for pleading guilty, 138 the fact that differential sentencing 
occurs is indisputable. 139 Sometimes the threat ofthe heavier sentence 
is overt, more often it is implicit. In pl~ces where it is the policy of the 
prosecutor to make a sentencing recommendation after trial, prosecutors 
will invariably recommend a sentence heavier than they would have 
suggested had the defendant plead guilty. 140 There would be no credibility 
135 But when a defendant pleads guilty, there is no guarantee of a lower sentence than 
the statutory maximum without a judicial commitment of such. See, e.g., People v. 
McCann, 303 A.D.2d 780, 780 (App. Div. 2003) ("Although defense counsel and the 
People jointly recommended that defendant be sentenced to 1 Y2 to 3 years in prison, 
County Court made clear to defendant during the plea proceeding that, 'in spite of the 
agreement that the District Attorney ... made with [his] attorney, [the court] was not 
promising [him] anything' in terms of sentencing."); State v. Tappa, 655 N.W.2d 223, 
227 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002) (rejecting defendant's argument that he should have gotten 
a lighter sentence because his co-defendants had all received lighter sentences); 
Robinson v. State, 836 So. 2d 747,751 (Miss. 2002) ("Despite Robinson's contention 
that he was somehow lured into pleading guilty, the record indicates that his plea was 
free and voluntary without threat or coercion . . .. The trial judge is . . . solely 
responsible for detennining the appropriate sentence."). 
136 KATZ, supra note 19, at 206 (noting that defendants who already have experience 
with the criminal justice system know they are more likely to get a lenient sentence if 
they plead guilty than if they go to trial). 
137 See United States v. Wiley, 184 F. Supp. 679,687 (N.D. Ill. 1960). 
138 See supra subsection III(A). 
139 See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
140 James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prose cut oria I Power, 94 HARV. L. REv. 
1521,1535 (1981) ("Whatever the strength of the defendant's case, prosecutors have 
enormous leverage to ensure concessions for defendants who make deals and harsher 
treatment for those who do not."). One prosec~tor described this practice explicitly. 
"If we can avoid a trial, we may not suggest jail. Ifwe do have to go through trial, you 
can expect that we will speak for a tough sentence, and we seem to be having some effect 
on the judges." John Hagan & Ilene Nagel Bernstein, The Sentence Bargaining of 
Upperworld and Underworld Crime in Ten Federal District Courts, 13 LAW & SOC'Y 
REv. 467, 475 (1979). 
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to the original plea offer, no stick to make the carrot a carrot ifthe prose-
cutor made the same recommendation on sentence after the defendant 
rejected his plea offer and was convicted at trial. 
The judge, too, must play her role in the differential sentencing 
scheme. If sentences after trial and conviction were the same as would 
be imposed after a plea bargain, very few defendants would be likely to 
plead guilty before this judge. 141 Sometimes judicial participation in 
differential sentencing based on the decision to exercise or forego the 
right to trial is particularly obvious, such as when a judge commits herself 
to a certain sentence as part of the plea bargain and then sentences the 
defendant more harshly after he is convicted at trial. 142 If the defendant 
rejects the plea offer and goes to trial, what value will her commitment 
to a reduced sentence during the plea negotiations have in future cases 
ifher sentence after trial is no greater than that offered as part ofthe plea? 
The only way plea bargaining works is if everyone knows the judge 
is highly likely to impose a heavier sentence after trial than she would 
have imposed had the defendant pled guilty. At times, the difference in 
sentence between what was offered as part ofthe plea negotiations and 
what the defendant receives at trial is extreme,143 sometimes so extreme 
141 See Craig Haney & Michael 1. Lowy, Bargain Justice in an Unjust World: Good 
Deals in the Criminal Courts?, 13 LAW & SOC'y REv. 632, 645 (1979) (noting that, 
for plea bargaining to function, judges must do their part by sentencing more harshly 
those defendants who reject plea offers and are convicted at trial). 
142 Hampton v. Wyrick, 588 F.2d 632,633 (8th Cir. 1978) (affmning the post-trial 
sentence of fifty years after defendant rejected a plea bargain with a recommended 
sentence of twenty-five years that had been accepted by the judge); State v. Korum, 86 
P.3d 166, 167 (Wash. Ct. App.) (reversing the sentence ofa defendant who initially 
agreed to a plea deal of 135 months in prison, withdrew his sentence and received 1208 
months in prison because the State filed an additional thirty-two counts), reh 'g granted, 
101 P.3d 108 (Wash. 2004); Statev. Young, 602 S.E.2d374, 380 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004) 
(remanding a case for re-sentencing after the trial court warned the defendant that he 
would receive a higher sentence ifhe chose to go to trial); People v. Dennis, 328 N.E.2d 
135, 13 8 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975) (reversing a sentence after petitionerrej ected a plea bargain 
of two to four years that was accepted by the judge and getting a sentence of forty to 
eighty years after being found guilty at trial); State v. Baldwin, 629 P.2d. 222, 226 
(Mont. 1981) (remanding for re-sentencing the ten-year post-trial prison sentence of a 
defendant who was offered and rejected a plea in which the judge indicated the 
defendant would spend forty-five days in jail). 
143 See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text. 
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that an appellate court invalidates the sentence. l44 But, even when the 
sentence is only somewhat greater after trial than offered after a plea, it 
is unjustified by any theory of punishment, save the highly unrealistic use 
of the notion that the plea is the first step on the road to rehabilitation, 
discussed above. 145 In any event, all the parties understand that the 
judge's sentence after trial will be harsher, and they understand why. 
Of course, knowing something and being able to openly acknowledge 
it are two entirely different things in a system built on the fiction that plea 
bargaining imposes no penalty on those who go to trial. Judges who 
openly acknowledge what virtually all judges actually do are often 
rewarded for their honesty by having their sentences invalidated. 146 
Sentencing a defendant who goes to trial more harshly than he would have 
been sentenced had he pled guilty (or the analogous situation of sentenc-
ing two defendants of similar backgrounds and culpability to different 
sentences based solely on which one pled guilty) is something a judge 
can do but not something a judge can admit she is doing. 147 This 
hypocrisy fostered by the plea bargaining system is evident. 
Imagine a situation in which the prosecutor and defendant arrive at a 
plea bargain that includes the prosecutor's recommendation of a certain 
sentence in exchange for the defendant's guilty plea. Assume that the 
judge agrees to the plea bargain and commits him or herself to impose 
the agreed upon sentence. The defendant, wishing to make a fully 
informed decision before deciding to plead guilty or go to trial, has the 
temerity to ask the judge what sentence he will receive from the judge 
should he be convicted after a trial with nothing else affecting sentencing. 
The judge may respond correctly and safely only that she is not bound 
by the sentence that was agreed to as part of the proposed plea bargain. 
But what if the defendant asks whether the judge will sentence him to 
more time after trial? The answer to that question is almost certainly yes, 
144 See, e.g., State v. Morris, 825 N.E.2d 637,640-42 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005); Korum, 
86 P.3d at 167; Davis v. State, 860 So. 2d 1058, 1060-61 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003); 
Dennis, 328 N.E.2d at 138. 
145 See supra notes 86-107. 
146 See, e.g., Morris, 825 N.E.2d at 640-42; Davis, 860 So. 2d at 1060; Wiley, 184 
F. Supp. at 681-85; Johnson v. State, 336 A.2d 113, 117-18 (Md. 1975). 
147 See supra notes 86-107. 
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but should the judge tell that to the defendant so as to allow him to make 
an intelligent decision about whether to plead guilty? An appellate court 
would likely invalidate the judge's sentence, declaring it to be punishment 
for exercising the right to trial. 148 Basically, judges can proceed in this 
manner with regard to plea bargaining; they just cannot openly acknowl-
edge what they are doing. 
VII. The Truth Will Set You Free 
There is a way to avoid the insincerity and hypocrisy caused by a 
system that denies that differential sentencing embodies punishment for 
exercising the right to trial. Put simply, the way out is to acknowledge 
reality and deal with it in a manner that is consistent with constitutional 
law. The Supreme Court hinted at a way out as long ago as 1968 in 
United States v. Jackson. 149 
Jackson was charged with violating the Federal Kidnapping Act then 
in existence. A provision ofthat statute provided for the death sentence 
but only "if the verdict ofthe jury shall so recommend.,,150 There was 
no manner within the statute for imposing a death sentence upon a person 
who either pled guilty or was convicted after electing a bench rather than 
a jury trial. 1S1 The Court held that such an approach "discourage[s] 
assertion of the Fifth Amendment right not to plead guilty and to deter 
exercise of the Sixth Amendment right to demand a jury trial."152 
However, what is interesting is that the Court made clear that governmen-
tal activity that discourages or chills the exercise of a constitutional right 
is not in and of itself unconstitutional. 
At one point, the Court observed, "If the provision had no other 
purpose or effect than to chill the assertion of constitutional rights by 
penalizing those who choose to exercise them, then it would be patently 
148 !d. 
149 390 U.S. 570 (1968). 
ISO Jackson, 390 U.S. at 570-71 (quoting Federal Kidnapping Act, 18 U.S.C. § 
1201(a) (2003)). 
lSI Id. at 571. 
IS2Id. at 581. 
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unconstitutional."153 The Court then examined the "other purpose" 
offered by the government for chilling the exercise ofthe right to trial and 
found the purpose wanting because it could be accomplished in ways that 
do not penalize the right to trial. 154 The Court then noted, "whatever 
might be said of the Congress' objectives, they cannot be pursued by 
means that needlessly chill the exercise of basic constitutional rightS.,,155 
Although the strong implication from this statement is that needful 
chilling of a basic constitutional right would therefore be permissible, the 
Court's subsequent words allow for more than just an implication. In 
responding to the Government's assertion that the chilling ofthe right to 
a jury trial in the Federal Kidnapping Act was incidental rather than 
intentional, the Court wrote, "The question is not whether the chilling 
effect is 'incidental' rather than intentional; the question is whether that 
effect is unnecessary and therefore excessive." 156 Lest there be any doubt, 
the Court later maintains that the "evil" in the Act is that it "needlessly 
encourages" jury waivers and guilty pleas. 157 
The Jackson Court found the Federal Kidnapping Act unconstitutional 
because it chilled the exercise of the right to trial without good reason. 
Unlike the Federal Kidnapping Act provision invalidated in Jackson, the 
differential sentencing that is embodied in every day plea bargaining is 
not contained in writing. As discussed above, however, such chilling or 
punishing occurs in the vast majority of criminal cases in this country. ISS 
Since its decision in Jackson, the Supreme Court has made clear that "not 
every burden on the exercise of a constitutional right, and not every 
pressure or encouragement to waive such a right, is invalid.,,159 
153/d. (emphasis added). 
154/d. at 582. 
155/d. (emphasis added). 
1561d. 
157/d. at 583. 
158 See supra notes 2 & 27 and accompanying text. 
159 Corbittv. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 218 (1978). Expressingasirnilarsentiment 
in McGautha v. California, the Supreme Court wrote that, "[t]he criminal process, like 
the rest of the legal system, is replete with situations requiring 'the making of difficult 
judgments' as to which course to follow. Although a defendant may have a right, even 
of constitutional dimensions, to follow whichever course he chooses, the Constitution 
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The real question to be answered is twofold: first, whether the way in 
which we chill the exercise of the right to trial through differential sen-
tences for those who plead guilty and those who go to trial is done for 
good reason; and second, whether there is no other means to accomplish 
the same ends. 160 This discussion would require an analysis ofthe bene-
fits that society derives from getting most defendants charged with crimes 
to avoid going to trial. Such an analysis would start, but certainly not end, 
with the significant savings of time and resources that result from 
disposing of cases without full trials. 161 The discussion would also 
involve consideration of some of the drawbacks of plea bargaining. 162 
If the benefits were found to be significant and to outweigh the draw-
backs, then, applying the approach used by the Supreme Court in Jackson, 
the next step would be to see ifthe benefits attributed to plea bargaining 
could be achieved in some other way. 163 Ifthey could not, it would then 
be acceptable to chill the exercise of the right to trial by offering lower 
sentences to defendants who plead guilty and more severe sentences for 
those who go to trial. 
This is, of course, what already occurs, but now there would be a 
genuine constitutional legitimacy based on an honest realization of what 
plea bargaining actually entails. Furthennore, such an approach would 
does not by that token always forbid requiring him to choose." 402 U.S. 183, 213 
(1971). 
160 Reasons why differential sentencing practices stemming from plea bargaining 
benefit both the prosecution and defense can be found in Brady v. United States, 397 
U.S. 742, 750-53 (1970). See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,403 (1963) 
(holding that the appellant's First Amendment rights could be substantially infringed 
if there was a "compelling state interest"), overruled by N.Y. State Empl. Rels. Bd. v. 
Christ the King Reg'l High School, 682 N.E.2d 960 (N.Y. 1997). 
161 McDONALD, supra note 20, at 93; HEUMANN, supra note 17, at 25-26; see supra 
note 55. 
162 See, e.g., Note, The Unconstitutionality of Plea Bargaining, 83 HARV. L. REv. 
1387 (1970). 
163 After Alaska curtailed its use of plea bargains, the state's courts saw an increase 
of attorneys, police, and court efficiency. Also, the disposition times for felony cases 
dropped drastically. The attorney general's goals were to return the sentencing functions 
to judges and improve the quality of justice. PLEA BARGAINING 51-52 (William F. 
McDonald & James A. Cramer eds., 1980). Of course it very well may be that what 
worked in Alaska would not work in jurisdictions with heavier case loads. 
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obviate the need for courts to create fictitious distinctions between reward 
and punishment and allow them to emerge from the disingenuousness that 
has dominated their discussion of plea bargaining for far too long. 164 
164 See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 997 F.2d 1475, 1480 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Jones 
was a case that dealt with the amount of reduction in sentence the defendant would 
receive for "accepting responsibility" after he was convicted at trial. The trial judge 
chose notto give Jones the same level of reduction he would have received for pleading 
guilty, commenting that, "[b]ecause ... the case did go to trial, I am going to add an 
additional six months to the Guideline sentence that I intend to impose, and will impose 
a sentence of 127 months." !d. at 1477. In response to the appellate court majority's 
characterization of the trial judge's actions as withholding leniency rather than ad-
ministering punishment, Chief Judge Mikva wrote in dissent: 
For reasons that I do not understand, my colleagues in the majority insist on mischar-
acterizing what the district judge actually did. They insist that the district judge did 
not increase Mr. Jones' sentence because of his failure to plead guilty, but rather 
gave him less of the benefit allowable for acceptance of responsibility. As I discuss 
below, this may be a distinction without a difference when it comes to the 
constitutional obligations of a sentencing judge. But in any case, that is not what 
the trial judge did. He said he was punishing Mr. Jones for going to trial; he did not 
claim he was withholding leniency. It is as if the majority wants to deny the trial 
judge the opportunity to get the very guidance that he sought. 
[d. at 1480 (Mikva, J., dissenting). 
